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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Trial Court No. 984402025 
Appellate Case No. 20001104-C A 
Priority Classification 15 
KENNETH M. HALL, 
Appellant, 
v. 
DEBORA HALL, 
Appellee. 
Appeal from a ruling of the Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
Judge of the Third District Court 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant submits the following as his Brief herein: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final order and judgment entered herein is vested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a decree of divorce and supporting findings of fact and 
conclusions of law dated February 7, 2000, and the amended findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and amended decree of divorce entered on November 17, 2000. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in this case are: 
1. Did the Appellant agree that the forty acres of undeveloped land would not be part 
of the marital estate? The standard of review relative to this issue is the clearly erroneous 
standard see Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257,259 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Richie v. Richie, 
784 P.2d 465,467 (Utah App. 1989)). 
2. Did the property awarded to Appellee in her previous marriage become a marital 
asset during her marriage to Appellant? The standard of review applicable to this issue is the 
abuse of discretion standard. See Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App. 
1992). 
3. Was the property award to the Appellant equitable? The standard of review 
relative to this issue is the abuse of discretion standard. See Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 
818, 820 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982)). 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(1) (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an amended decree of divorce entered on November 17, 
2000. A bench trial was held on November 24, 1999, at the conclusion of which the court 
took the matter under advisement. A memorandum decision was handed down on 
December 20, 1999. On January 3, 2000, the Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration 
of the memorandum decision which was denied by the court on February 7, 2000. 
Following the preparation of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the filing of 
objections thereto by the Appellant, a decree of divorce and supporting findings of fact 
and conclusions of law were signed on February 7, 2000, and amended findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and an amended decree of divorce were signed on November 17, 
2000. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on December 7, 2000. 
FACTS 
The following factual presentation represents a marshalling of the evidence presented 
by Appellant and Appellee at the trial court level. 
(For ease of reference, the Petitioner/Appellant will be referenced throughout the 
remainder of this brief as "Ken" and Respondent/Appellee as "Debora". References to the 
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pleadings in the record on appeal are by the letter "R" followed by the arabic number placed 
on the pleading during the pagination process. In some cases, the letter "P" is used to 
indicate the paragraph number of the document. References to the trial transcript are 
identified by the letters Tp followed by the page number of the transcript. Exhibits are 
referred to by the exhibit number. Other major documents are in the Addendum.) 
1. During their marriage, the parties lived at 18185 West 1540 North, Fairfield, 
Utah which comprised a home on one acre and 40 adjacent unimproved acres of pasture 
land, some irrigated and some unirrigated, and twenty-five shares of water stock 
purchased with the land, all hereinafter referred to as the "Property". R. 11 P 6 
2. The Property was awarded to Debora in her previous divorce. See Exhibit 
10 P 7. 
3. In that divorce action, Civil No. 914400172, one of the Judges of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court found that 
A. at July 22, 1992, the Property had an $80,000 value, see Exhibit 10 P 6, 
and 
B. the Property was encumbered by a $44,353 debt owed to Earl and Gayle 
Crossman, evidenced by a trust deed note dated November 22, 1985, signed by Debora 
and her former husband, Vernaar J. Wilson. See Exhibit 11. 
4. The Property was awarded to Debora, subject to the indebtedness owed to 
Crossmans, leaving her an equity at July 22, 1992, of $35,646.77. See Exhibit 10 P 6. 
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5. The trust deed held by the Crossmans covered the Property i.e. the home, the 
one acre, the forty acres of irrigated and unirrigated pasture and the twenty-five shares of 
water stock. See Exhibit 11. 
6. The debt to the Crossmans was due in March of 1993, eight months after Ken 
and Debora were married. See Exhibit 11. 
7. Ken had no legal obligation to the Crossmans. See Exhibit 11. 
8. As a veteran of the Persian Gulf War, Ken had the right to obtain one V.A. 
loan. Tp. 50 line 18. 
9. Debora could not apply for a loan from First Security Bank until she had 
worked there for one year. Tp. 57 line 7. 
10. Debora knew that First Security Bank would not loan money on raw land. Tp. 
60 line 3. 
11. On March 11, 1993, Ken obtained a $52,852 V.A. loan through First Security 
Bank. See Exhibit 12. 
12. Both Ken and Debora signed the V.A. loan. See Exhibit 12. 
13. The loan proceeds were used to pay Debora's debt to the Crossmans and make 
improvements to the home in which the parties resided during their marriage. Tp. 68 
line 2. 
14. Ken testified that at no time prior to obtaining the V.A. loan to pay Crossmans 
and make improvements to the house did the parties 
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A. discuss dividing the Property. Tp. 45. 
B. discuss that all Ken would receive was an interest in the house and 1 
acre. Tp. 45. 
15. Ken testified that he would not have utilized his VA entitlement if he had been 
told by Debora that all he would receive was an interest in the house and 1 acre. Tp. 45. 
16. Debora testified that prior to obtaining the V.A. loan to pay Crossmans and 
make repairs to the house 
A. she did not deed an interest in the 40 acres to Ken. Tp 60 line 19. 
B. Ken knew exactly how Debora felt about it. Tp 60 line 19. 
17. There exists no written agreement between the parties wherein Ken agreed to 
obtain a VA loan in exchange for a one half interest in only the home and one acre and 
not in the adjacent forty acres. 
18. Monthly payments on the V.A. loan were made by Ken and Debora from their 
joint earnings during the marriage and, since their separation in September of 1998, each 
paid one half of the monthly payment as ordered by the court in the temporary mutual 
restraining order and order on order to show cause dated November 2, 1998. 
19. At the time of trial, 
A. the balance owed under the V.A. loan, sold by First Security Bank to 
Countrywide Funding, was approximately $44,500 
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B. the house and one acre had a fair market value of $111,000, see Exhibits 
7 and 8, and 
C. the vacant acreage had a fair market value of $157,600. See Exhibit 9. 
20. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement and 
on December 20, 1999, issued a memorandum decision in which, among other things, the 
court ruled that the home and one acre comprised a marital asset but that the adjacent forty 
acre parcel was not a marital asset and awarded the same to Debora as her sole and separate 
property. 
21. After the court issued its memorandum decision and prior to the entry of the 
decree of divorce, Ken filed a motion for reconsideration. 
22. By its February 7, 2000 ruling, the trial court denied Ken's motion. 
23. Pursuant to the court's memorandum decision and its ruling on Ken's motion for 
reconsideration, amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and an amended decree of 
divorce were entered on November 17, 2000. 
24 Ken filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 2000. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. There is no evidence that Ken understood that the 40 acres of 
undeveloped land would not be part of the marital estate. 
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In its amended findings of fact at paragraph 16, the trial court found that at the 
time of the signing of the V.A. loan documents, the parties discussed the remaining 40 
acres with Debora stating that such was to remain her separate property. 
A close examination of the evidence clearly shows that there is nothing to support 
this finding and, therefore, that it is clearly erroneous. 
There is no written document stating that at the time he took out the V.A. loan, 
Ken understood that the 40 acres of undeveloped land would not be part of the marital 
estate. 
The only evidence presented on this point was the testimony of the parties: 
Debora testified at Tp. 60, as follows: 
Q But at any time did you ever deed him any interest in what we referred to as 
the acreage or the raw-
A No. He knew exactly how I felt about it. 
Ken testified at Tp. 45, as follows: 
Q Was there ever a discussion between you and Debbie prior to the time that 
you signed on that $52,000 loan of dividing up that property? 
A. No. 
Q Was there ever a discussion between the two of you where she said if you 
take out a $52,000 loan with me to pay off this obligation the only thing you 
will get out of it is a deed to the house and the one acre? 
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A. No. 
Q If she had told you that, would you have signed on the $52,000 loan? 
A Most definitely not. 
The foregoing testimony gives no support whatsoever to the finding of the trial 
court that the 40 acres was to remain the sole property of Debora and did not become part 
of the marital estate. 
POINT 2. All property awarded to Debora in her previous marriage became 
marital property during her marriage to Ken when he utilized his V.A. entitlement to pay 
for it. 
One question presented by this case is whether or not all of the real property 
awarded to the Debora in her previous marriage became marital property during her 
marriage to Ken. 
A similar situation existed in the case of Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 
931 (Utah 1982). Shortly after the parties were married, they sold the wife's home in 
Heber City and with the proceeds, purchased the Park City home from the husband's 
mother by paying her $1,500 and paying die State of Utah $4,500 to extinguish its lien on 
the property. Based upon these facts, the trial court awarded the wife one half interest in 
the parties' Park City home and the husband appealed. The Utah Supreme Court upheld 
the award to the wife by stating, at page 933 
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Assuming arguendo that the property was validly conveyed to the 
husband prior to the marriage, it does not follow that it must be awarded 
solely to him in a property settlement, especially where the wife has used 
her separate resources to purchase the property from the husband's mother 
and to clear pending liens. 
To further support the award, the high court quoted its ruling in Jackson v. 
Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340, l(Utah 1980), which states that 
The state of title to marital property prior to a divorce decree is not 
necessarily binding on the trial court in its distribution of such property 
pursuant to such decree. The trial court is empowered to make such 
distributions as are just and equitable, and may compel such conveyances as 
are necessary to that end. 
These cases support an award of one half of the Property to Ken on the basis that 
he used his separate resources to pay the $44,353 debt to Mr. Crossman i.e. he took out a 
V.A. loan and made payments on said loan for 7 years and 8 months. 
POINT 3 Equity demands that the Property was part of the marital estate. 
Ken understands that under the Utah Supreme Court case of Turner v. Turner, 649 
P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982), an appellate court may weigh the evidence and substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court in divorce actions but it will not do so lightly and 
merely because its judgment differs from that of the trial judge. A trial court's 
apportionment of marital property will not be disturbed unless there has been manifest 
injustice or inequity showing a clear abuse of discretion. 
Ken urges that the facts of this case clearly show injustice and inequity by the 
court's determination that the 40 acre parcel was not part of the marital estate. Most 
10 
persuasive is the fact that but for Ken utilizing his V.A. entitlement, Debora would have 
lost the Property which was the only asset she received from her first marriage. In as 
much as the trust deed held by the Crossmens was secured by all of the Property not just a 
portion thereof, it was unfair and unjust for the trial court to determine that Ken's V.A. 
loan purchased the entire Property but only a portion thereof became part of the marital 
estate. 
Of equal importance is an analysis of the math at the time Ken borrowed money to 
pay Debora's debt: 
Scenario I 
Prior to paying the Crossmens, there was no marital estate equity. 
Value of the Property $80,000 
Debt to the Crossmens 44,353 
Debora's equity 35,647 
Marital estate equity -0-
Scenario II 
After the Crossmens were paid, there was no marital estate equity. 
Value of Property $80,000 
V.A. Loan 52,852 
Debora's equity 35,647 
Marital estate equity < 1,501 > 
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Ken obligated himself to pay a $52,852 loan and in return believed he was entitled 
to a one-half interest in the Property. What he did to help Debora was in the context of a 
husband and wife relationship; it was not an arms length business deal. 
The facts of this case clearly show that the trial court's ruling worked such 
manifest injustice or inequity to Ken as to constitute a clear abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Ken urges 
A. that the trial court's ruling be reversed, 
B. that he be awarded one half of the Property after recognizing Debora's 
$35,644.77 premarital interest, and 
C. that he be awarded his costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this & day of July 2001, he mailed 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing brief, postage pre-paid, to: 
Donald W. Winters 
Attorney at Law 
375 East 790 South 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
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ADDENDUM 
14 
Thcr as R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369) 
Atto- ney for Petitioner 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City. UT 84102 
Telephone: (801)533-0525 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH M.HALL. 
V. 
DEBORA HALL, 
Petitioner, ] 
Respondent. ) 
) AMENDED DECREE OF 
DIVORCE 
1 Civil No. 984402025 
1 Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
Having previously entered its decree of divorce herein without considering the timely 
objection filed by Petitioner, now, pursuant to the motion of Petitioner for the entry of an 
amended decree of divorce and good cause appearing, the court based upon its amended findings 
of fact and amended conclusions of law now makes and enters the following amended decree of 
divorce: 
1. The Petitioner and Respondent are herewith awarded a Divorce each from the other, 
the same to become final upon March 7, 2000. 
2. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
3. Both parties are awarded the vehicles currently in their possession and each shall 
fourth Judicial District C^urt 
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separately assume the debt thereon and hold the other harmless therefrom. 
4. The personal property of the parties shall remain as presently divided except that 
Petitioner shall have the following: 
a) tiller; 
b) home on the range sheep camp; 
c) lumber in the barn; 
d) tractor and portable tack room and its contents. 
5. Petitioner is awarded $600 out of the remaining proceeds from the sale of two draft 
mules and tack which occurred on November 2, 1998. 
6. Petitioner is awarded one-half of the equity in the marital home and the one acre of 
land where it sits, this being the sum of $21,500.00 
7. Respondent is awarded the use and possession of the home and is ordered to pay 
Petitioner his equity within six months from the date of execution hereof. Interest shall accrue 
on Petitioner's herein awarded equity at the legal rate of 7.670 % commencing on the date of 
execution hereof. 
8. Each party is to pay their own attorneys fees. 
* 
* 
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DATED this 1 / day of November, 2000. 
QWGMAL
 //tr 
Anthony W^fchogeld,.-
Fourth DistrJgtCoT" " 
Approved as to form: 
Donala W. Winters 
Attorney for Respondent 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH M. HALL, 
V. 
DEBORA HALL, 
Petitioner, ] 
Respondent. ) 
) AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Civil No. 984402025 
> Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
Having previously entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, now, pursuant to 
the motion of Petitioner for die entry of amended findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
good cause appearing, the court now makes and enters the following amended findings of fact 
and conclusions of law: 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife having married on July 23, 1992. 
2. The marriage was childless and the parties separated during September of 1998, and 
have lived apart since that time. 
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3. Respondent was previously divorced on July 22, 1992. 
4. In Respondent's previous divorce she was awarded certain real property consisting 
of one parcel of approximately 40 acres of vacant ground and one parcel consisting of a house 
and approximately one acre of ground, together with 24 shares of water. 
5. At the time of the marriage of these parties both parcels of Respondent's real estate 
were encumbered by a debt still owing to the sellers thereof, Earl and Gayle Crossman, in the 
amount of $44,353.23. 
6. At the time of the purchase, Respondent and her then husband paid a $40,000.00 
down payment to the Crossmans against the full purchase price of $90,000.00 
7. At the time of the marriage of the parties to the present action, the vacant ground and 
the parcel with the house was worth approximately $80,000.00 with Respondent's equity therein 
being $35,646.77. 
8. On March 11, 1993, Petitioner obtained a $52,852 VA loan through First Security 
Bank. 
9. Both Petitioner and Respondent signed the VA loan. 
10. The loan proceeds were used to pay Respondent's debt to Mr. and Mrs Crossman 
and make improvements to the house in which Petitioner and Respondent resided during their 
marriage. 
11. Petitioner's income was utilized during the marriage to make the monthly payments 
on the VA loan. 
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12. By a temporary order dated November 2, 1998, each party was ordered to pay one 
half of the monthly payment on the VA loan. 
13. On March 11, 1993, in preparation for taking out a loan to pay off the party from 
whom she and her former husband originally purchased the real estate, the Respondent executed 
a Quitclaim Deed whereby she converted the house and acre into marital property of this 
marriage by naming Petitioner as a Joint Tenant with her on said property. 
14. Nearly concurrently with the execution of the foregoing Quitclaim Deed, the 
parties obtained a loan in the amount of $52,852.00 from First Security Bank using the house and 
one acre as collateral together with the Petitioner's VA entitlement. 
15. After this loan, the equity remaining in the house and one acre was approximately 
$32,000.00, of which one-half then belonged to each party as their share of what had then 
become marital property. 
16. At the time of the execution of the Quitclaim Deed and the signing of the loan 
documents, the parties discussed the remaining 40 acres with Respondent stating that such was to 
remain her separate property. 
17. Petitioner participated in the securing of the loan and the use of his VA entitlement 
knowing his consideration therefore was an interest in the house and one acre. 
18. The proceeds of the loan were primarily used to make final payment to the 
Crossmans. 
12d 
19. During the marriage, the Respondent consistently declined to convert the vacant 
acreage into a marital asset of the marriage. 
20. Subsequently these parties took out a line of credit loan which currently has a 
balance of approximately $19,000.00 (Bank One loan.) 
21. The proceeds of the Bank One loan were used in part to effect repairs and for 
remodeling on the house and in part to pay bills of the parties and to acquire further marital 
assets. 
22. The house and one acre presently has a fair market value of $ 1 1 1,000.00 
23. The vacant acreage presently has a fair market value of $ 157,600.00. 
24. The personal property of the parties has already been physically divided, with the 
exception that the tiller, home on the range sheep camp, lumber in the barn, tractor and portable 
tack room and its contents should be awarded to Petitioner in as much as these items were 
purchased by him either in trade for property he owned before he married Respondent or from 
the proceeds of the sale of the Lehi property he owned prior to his marriage to Respondent. 
25. After the above items have been restored to Petitioner, the value of the personal 
property taken by the Petitioner, including livestock, will be equal to the value of the personal 
property retained by the Respondent. 
26. Existing debt against the house and one acre, including the Bank One Loan is 
$68,000.00 
27. Equity to be divided in the house and one acre is $43,000.00. 
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28. Respondent should be awarded use and possession of the home subject to the 
payment of Petitioners^ equity. 
From the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that it has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the 
issues and parties in this action. 
2. Each party is entitled to a divorce from the other on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
3. Neither party is entitled to receive alimony form the other. 
4. Both parties shall keep the vehicle currently in their possession and assume the debt 
thereon and hold the other party harmless. 
5. Personal property shall be divided as set forth above in the findings. 
6. The property which consists of the house and the one acre is a marital asset. 
7. Petitioner should be awarded judgment in the amount of one-half the equity in the 
parcel of marital property being, $21,500. Respondent is awarded the use and possession of the 
home, she should take steps to obtain the necessary financing to satisfy Petitioner's equity in the 
property within six (6) months of the signing of the final Order and Judgment 
8. The $ 1,200.00 on deposit in Respondent's attorney's trust account should be divided 
equally between the parties. 
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9. Each party should be ordered to assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in connection with this action. 
DATED this JO day ofS$£da!x,2QQ0. ,Y\U'w^ QY9 JlMC 7$ 5^tcmber, 2000. ¥W> fv9 
vlW*W l"7, "Z°Qt) 
Approved as to form: 
;onvakt W. Winters 
Attorney for Respondent 
W 
Anthony 
Fourth Di; 
fcp/ £ j < -*. ~v - ^ • 
i,CourrJBage
 v 
CD - ^ U , 
*X» •"*<• -w C 
123 
30-3-4 HUSBAND AND WIFE 10 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may 
order a party to provide money during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment. 1993 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affi-
davit — Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
petitioner or petitioner's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the 
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be sub-
mitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the ap-
proval of the court. 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or 
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both 
parties have attended the mandatory course described in 
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of 
course completion to the court. The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of 
the parties, if it determines course attendance and 
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The 
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter 
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's 
affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 1997 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4, Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Divi-
sion of debts — Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — De-
termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious pe-
tition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tive creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding 
the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grand-
parents, and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision, 
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under 
this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visita-
tion provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member 
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where 
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac-
tors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base ali-
mony on the standard of living that existed at the time of 
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living. 
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THIS TRUST DEED, made this .?2odday of tfoystf»rJ:> ..., i&&5.- ^ 
between . . . V ™ ^ . . J.v.)![IL^..ard. . PEBBIE G. I f l L ^ ^ j M S ^ ^ ... (V 
as TRUSTOR, 
who- addrea. ia JJU&Z... Jt/j^JSW f b ^ 
VAJLJ^.JITy..0f).
 f « TRUSTEE,* and 
y E j & j r . _ C R Q S S ^ 
.QP5£M^,_t^ir..^
 t „ EiEN^PICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in .litnll .. 
County, State of Utah: 
As per Exhibit "A", attached hereto and by reference herein made a part hereof. 
Together with 25 shares Primary Water Fairfio.J Irrigation Co. and Well rights 
under Usev's Claim *5-220-U4 CA (UGWC #54-220) 
Together with ill buildings, fixtures and improvements th* eon and all water righu, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 2 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with saio property, or any part thereoi, w 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafbi siv-m to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OP SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, ia the principal *um of $. 5CL,.QQQ...GQ. 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as I 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such sdditional loan* or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a pionweory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of sllfsume 
tiyeftifr^ or. amsced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as hecefe. provided. 
: *» a ma**** «T the Utafe State Bar; a teak, buOdiaf aad faea ataabatioe or atrial* 
IhoriajK*. to 4a a^faMSJmsc in Uu*»; • corso«*te iettlhoristd to da s trot bmnmm in 
am 7 a t k s ^ T 3 a ^ y a«taoris«d to eo aWlwikaai in Utek 
Feb 08 1999 10:23 UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS 
I XHI1IT "A" - LEGAL OBSCIIPTXON 
MM 
Jk0 
PARCEL 1: B^glcnipg at a point in a fence line on the South aide of * County 
road South 425.91 feet and Heat 725*54 feet froa the north quarter corner of 
Section 32, T--araeaip 3 Kouth, lance 2 Went, Salt Lake Bene and Meridian; thence 
South 0*03*30** Ut% 22&*«S2 feet to the quarter section line froa which the 
center of ?r.: :i?n 32? T>wnship 6 South, Range 2 Vest bears Seat 726.00 feet; 
thence weci $V^0Q fiat; thence Horth 0*03'30" Vent along a lln* parallel vita 
th<* North-ScutU quarcer-eectlon line 1837.38 feet to a point in a fence on the 
Southeasterly side of e State Highway; thence along the fence on the 
Southeasterly tide of said highway, along the arc of a 2900 foot radius curve to 
the Left 499.77 feet the long chord of which bears Horth 34*29*30" Eaat 499.15 
feet to a fence corner on the South side of a County road; thence South 89*13' 
Seat 310*97 feet along the fence on the South line of the County road to the 
point of beginning. 
\jrfU!L TOGETHER WITH and subject to a right-of-way eaaeaent 6 feet wide on the Eaat side the Northerly 700 feet of said property am sex forth in a right-of-way aent recorded on February 13, 1975 aa Entry No. 2281 in Sook 1404 at Page 
649» records of Utah County, Utah. 
PARCEL 2: Lot 2, Block 9, Fairfield Survey of Building Lots, according to the 
official plat thereof on file in the office of the Utah County Recorder. 
f y PARCEL 3: All of Lots 7, 8, 9, Block 4, Fairfield Survey of Building Lots, ft/y according to the official plat thereof on file in the office of the Utah County # * * Recorier. 
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UTAH 
PIOV0 , Uuh 
i*.iar.$tf Xirsft 11 , 19 U 
THIS LOAN IS NOT ASSUMABLE WITHOUT 
THE APPROVAL OF THE DEPARTMENT ~$F 
VETERANS AFFAIRS OR ITS AUTHORIZED 
AGENT 
I W V A J M l . m h ij« m# wd+r»t|na4 prwabe<*) to par ^ 
f l r t t I t a a r t t T ! • * * * * U t * * » K .A. , or a r ^ r , 
iH* prt*M^*Hum erf m t y « T * » TXcu*«na1 £ l c * H Mo*ar«4 l l f t y - T w o m d K o / 1 0 0 — — — . —» 
OoAtrt (3 $ 2 , 5 8 2 . 0 0 ) , wtfth irftftrert from d m al l>»* nr« o/ E I ^ M , 
per aontam ( l .aCOfl <%) j » * annsro a * t h * anptid h4it«c* onH}-^«i4 TSe 
*M principal i « l taa\***t fh«ll U ptysbltat JJW o/At»o( ? 1 r i ? * « o u r i t y I m l c a t l i t 1ft, fl.jl. 
421 4 . * U i n I t r « « T , J j l t l J t » C i t y . UT 34111 In J a l t L i U C H ) , Ulaft 
or at sadl <**«r p&CB t i lh« Neidflf t**y 4aa4pnis in vrlltaf dailvwakl of m*jW,d \o xhm (Ublor, 
M r « t l * « w r » t y ! « * * §1 U t * * , ft 1 . 
i« mao^r tatiifcMKs of T*r«« ffutfrtal flfftfy-t«t«R sitd 4W1flC 
Porta n (3 1 1 7 . 1 1 ) , caflMKsadn* o« tf* iVtf d*7 erf tfiy , t t a i , " 4 oowtWiwmf o« r t w / i m day at 
tac6 joaruh Ifcanetftar uMil IhU nola n fufly p**dt **o»p< lh«(, if no< »on«r p*l4. the fiiul p«jm«rt orf pr^Ctioti «ad 
Mlvrttt %^U b« dut ifw) p*y*fe*« on tha fln* darf of Apr 11 1Q21 
Pi-Matt* ** f»*»rwd to pr«p*r ** * * 7 **»«*» • f thow pfttnMan or fatT 0 * a*rir* l»d*frii'ic1aaBW or i/ty pari tbtracV « * 
lam rKaa tH* a*aowa< «W o* t iraullJMiii , «r 0*0 htiodrad 4ef i in (31CJO}). v ^ k ^ w f h lm±j?r*p*j*mM la fo4 »H*J ba 
atMkti em {fm d«tA r*e»***d. Partial ^f<^tymcrx, <xh*r fMfl on «a tivUibndiM diM cUlA, nfftd rv»< S j cr*dil#^ widl \fm 
-if 
If u r f i l i l M w r / U &+ pwymiet of irry l a iu l ioem u*d*f (Xii. noi* rt AO( m*£* food Trior <o ttw i n * - -feis o< dfe« 
«Mct mdb I w u f i w i M , Ot« «mi#« p^odpai t u n incf t a n j e d iMberMt ihail at ooc» h<cc<i¥» dot l ad ; * j *Mai v ^ t e i c 
satkv x4 t W uyrtix <rf th« hc4^tr <«r tttk rwtt. Pifl«r» td M^daM- th«W ovH^o* a*uil noC aamdevU 1 ^ « * * w otf t t e rif^C 
M f w r t l M vh» t u r n ** ib+ *^sast a^ * *7 j c f r ^ v c M defee*. tf iciltw W Imtitatod * « (7^t lda l t l>a> TxMtf^ptW 
f I » I « u(») to p r f f»eK « m u di« CdQ/t mrf fh aa t n o n w / i fpoav 
Tbat • a t l tad t u d * a B i i a^wraOhr v t K v p i i K i w t ^ , yrmam «ad •dMtaa i ( ,^o5or W protnr, 6mmmd 
JataaMsr a«ri i3B^njt im( o< this •o** T &mi au^wiWy i f j n * *^ aat IhJa aote, o r tvf-pf^HMeC thtwwadar, « K / b t t 
|f«a> Cam tti v i rs vttTMQt k tory arty a f * *a i» t t^o ^10^17 r f I^t A i i « r » t * a m ^ r w i t t m o X . 
aaaai <d 
TMa> ftot* W S K M M H b f 4 1>«4 0«i»4 0^ i m d t l t li^WaHtii Vf t W jmfcayrfywrt 00 cart^a pr9^trt)r 
«*d n ^ i i a n u t x ^ » y t r f a l y — d Jor * • ica^ i t tga of i«i4 proparty o r iha ki|ji«;<aa^»ou Cbatjrvom, 
' ffcC* hat^ j , ataioa-. »|iMty. 
(SHAM I«A14 
JOUM; 
a^iaai i m | * y 4 That OairfW M » 4 a » l 
A 
j*7% a*? jo no*fod <U*» /o IMMOOJIT ?MQ l«tpnt>ui fpaaaottf 
<l»» : r f n i at j> 
j*«\ *o r u n * »>• ^*n fcv* n*C/r%i imv*9wn>g) 
w pjan JO 1 IKWOHJKOWT **<««. toy n&rvq? Dm ovx^awnr 
noau f i p«nr *p»n i—Amcrc m » a aads I T H I I W I 
1 t n u m t pir* *rrt j© A o ^ u t ju >«eo }»VMCJW * w v ) d n 
put a n T » *•*! «* »—u—gcurf je v^eav V^M £a» nujvp 
7»rt o» * w >*i Jft«*>* /•»»«.•— 5*|i pay* 01 *»U>OAJ«4 
>i #0 •jorni i n /ow pvr wt .«e .> *r>« jo iwrjuuif 
n^»3 mug p*-/«n 1J tTPU, x^ «**^D ^ tooo^ MM*. »<Q 
• M » fv l«M-p v«vw iijq» (nC) A « i *m* ** »1 >t 
7 ^ pa* J * U ^ JayiWi— «» joud K? ««. sxoddc 
- .an po/vp pes «f xndfcr ' i . i i i n i , 
law j«) Ajacfcg^ pmt aoda »M0 a p»*i«j— 
^ ^ u - m**,Sr&**± ****** J*C%*~i pm Tjm+i± ~*4m^ 
* a nc\ * K. x\ in •,* 1* 1 
\l>2 ->*. >*jp p ^ i o i n n 
: • % « 1 
^ * *
, i 5 * ^ * ^ r ^ - c * * ^ ^ ^ * • 
. ,<•.••<«• »«*k »l«k-~»r * %»q'ir««<t»«l «*»»4< .t# *..«<* f,»» I he 
,..«* .*# • «•«•« W » * A * * J *»T HrrK<*M*J)» ?o# 1»»C »itt»a»H*», 
*••.! p.«^r»t». Jor >»**J <V * « > - ^ i t l ijaiftJl fl.<? «v«K i « l 
h.« .« T -»«fwr »wT7*o** *-.<*»*»*c*i ^Kf«w#*«i4/. S«M1 not* t.# 
a,*** vA-A ^ **otr*A V»rrt»x »» » P*»«> ~»C» »*•* *a Utt^ 
M ,< IX*- t j.KirM C*^AT-CB»1- ih<r«Fvy w</« ^ciwtkJ in lUr 
««««* fi/%* J««<r^>4 »N«n»r: i»iU-i«^y«Waw<j»4ri *«*« nr ru**j 
»A.fl K*.*' ~**r*»t~ a« »K«- »«te~ p»o*>»ktJ for in. fhe pH*7i^uL 
*»o»Mrdm*a.. and- >*alV o< j»aj»a*e- '<« appr<arun*«ely <n«» l 
wowMy p+jm*nw- *r- io«a- ^ e o o t a . may oe »peeit uporv 
Vf l**- <r*»Jitor and defctor. F«inf.t 10 a^ree on if>e- maiunry. 
u«« wnole of A a um»-<*riunr» toyativanoad «hnA H» da* **ti 
r*7W>ic- m*iy (>S} ^a>* * / W d«A*j^Ty' Aft 'crt^r^."'?**"*** 
r - r * »*>U \h9 waftaflty « « « « * fra^ajfieVKa a j W i y j a y r t e y * * 
,W iW *<*»e An* oan>T\rd a^ew. . : *•'/ «" • •..—*••• . 
IJ * , t rwy*** jiaywvaaa- of any «iuA 1 * « W ' n«r»ky 
irttf M* o w dnar. ftenrfWary doe* *<* -*M^r IH H i ^ H f W 
to rao*»r» pmntpt . pay*"*>f t tKrtt d**C" of ail OlK«f HUM! faO 
i « v « 4 <y s o A> •<•!»• dc<««U for fe«J«tr» M IO 7*7. 
1«. T W TVs*»i Oa**l Wtail r«m«l« In fun forae and efTc.7 
aartii »«y- j»o>apo —m<m o* ett«n»*<u* o< sh< time of 
p+y^+i+ o4 tft« UdaN#*cin*-» or ««y part ihcr«<i/ ac<urcU 
r ^ M i cW a<twfV^w7. pmrmmr ot la fee* »rwd proentaJioA 
<9^  i»^ TV«at 0 o « i &»d Lft< nou for- f n<la<vrnwn« (m ca*« oi 
r%J fwcoavTT^*10*' for CJW»CBIU<1O* t o d rrKTMioo). v i f^o iH 
Uivca+t Tib* W^airy o l Alty >er^*w» A x !h« ^ • y m < n l 3^ !fi« 
Mdebfff^rm, Tnac4« may ( i ) const nc to (M fn^kint 3/ %*y 
m*p of pew 9^ MKI prcrperry; (b) jom * trtmtaf .j»y 
iwbardwvMio* or oOcr urorT»w«JM Ul<tJ»wt A * ~n** &t*4 
* v n « y ( J J or w«y pan a/ ***** property. T V ( n t M c 1A 
prncxm eno<lcd liNrrdo." u*4 \hm ncduii iJ»cn««» 0^  a*»y 
m*iun <x (men dmA >*m oon<jus»«« proat 3/ !hc 0Mihhii««3» 
<twr«o'. Tn«*a*'i f«e» /or my of (b< icrv^oc* «en(Jo»o<l in 
II. As 1 i^ftii—J ftcewnff, Trw*or bcru^y M t ^ i to 
at of ( A M * m a a « til 
»;wiri<B, u»d Trorta 4f Ac 7ru>*ry alT«a<d 
Vy tt^, TT^B? D«ad 4«d oC *or panoMi ^u^wiy !«QMr>i 
f»«ruow. Uvtfl TKMar iJb«J berfJOU * iA» 7*yi«n( 0/ »«y 
*a*te«dMCB w m r i ^m,af or >« oW ymriorm^m «/ any 
m w w m V c m a ^ r . Traanr iteA H«v«- :»« rtgjii r# 
oaO«i iA a c t w n t , «>•««, ro^iHte»r aew* pro4ki r>nwti 
f n ' i ' t narrtft, laMHK /cry«Maiv krt praAU i m i * t ^ 
1 "J • 4 ^r *^^«» <* t * r ••U P«»- ^ mbxnk U w r «/ « i d 
pc^pMTy. if Tin a w **M oj*/iuii JM tforcuLd. TOIMO^I ntfn 
» -nni it vmf- *t amCk wmr>* lAtffi ot**f «Ad 9«o*Tki»rf 
ctaU W-» * • AJK, ««*> or -w&mt *Jd*t pmmm^M o< ih« 
^ m a^ fj ^fcemaT^ wTBeyy, to n»\wct il ftaKM, roy»irt«r. 
• w t , m+ pmtVK, ^ a * r r o r d^ccrtfiuwot o< BoK^ieiiry 
tr j « f o«*r. i f fca» dbw to <5»« o cc**j[ txy axh » w » c / i 
that «CA W « r f o a a a i r xflmU T&c v T f^tM.i^ .wH ' r-+*tMAi4m 
oy to—Aiaty arf I B » rtfM. M « t . »>d *«cVrtry to ooAorr 
* r M M * ^ H o e j ^ t aaMKim* >*•»*, w * « a * « w v o/ Uw 
n«^r > r »<«»<V><ry *> uote l , . ismA H i, or be A *«cn*rt 10 
W . «*v .irffVwia) Vf PrMrtriity oi «wy m ^ ' t y , ten*- or 
* <W « r • » » or ttttrfC c«* * » T n c t OtmA uo mf 
mm? m * - r *—*>•«•***. M M , , A K I I p a r m . . by, ajjes^ 
erf w y n a r K y i o r . b ^ ^ 
< - t . 
i*i**« !»*>i <Juc w%4i »|fuT 'A* i«ntr. !<w \f«i».«A«i *tv>*>»«^ » 
1W »»j<f*'ion »-ui Co4U<lion. xiClotiirt i«&*UMMr itU»r»*<7 1 
2". !"Vr en«nn |t uf>fH* *f*3 Ui inf p o w . x o x vW uJd 
pr\l»t>rv, the cuile<!toA «*/ MJC>» ' # ' « . <«•««•. u d prn/;«t. x 
ia< ^rotJeodr i/ fire ami atftrr ln*or^*ca p>rtW-tx«, r>r 
<owp?/i**rto» <ir sw«/vt» for arrf uk»«t| or dj*njpe- 0/ ih« 
prop^rry, w&- (fte *«»nlWtj»*»r or- /«ie**e rW«o/ •» 
l iorctiul. JdaJJ rvM cure of waive ar.*- Hr/*uil 0/ *o**oer o*' 
dtUult .HereqiMlar or Uivmil^ Atr «ny ua don-r ptn^mt to 
2^. Up-w wk<»Ul ^y Tnwtor U» rt« p«yav*M 0/ i»y-
)«J#b«a<l*«»» **c«r»d fcrreby o-? In rix pa*+orm,-»<aT a4 **y 
Ktrc..l<rt< hrreondcr. BcrvcToary way dador* ail nana, 
jexu/rti K<r«hy \mm<Jk%U\y dx*a- «no ?ay*u*a- >y dallrary to 
T run re 0/ -xtitr* d«cia/v'on« <W dr(m^t I.' &>*rffk4«ry 
d«t«/f» v**4 )»i>txiTf if» ba »oi0. Il that) ocpoaH »«» Tr»<Ma 
ihla Tn«t D*«d »n<l iJ» pfomwwory n o l o and docamantt 
evidencing jxprwdh.-arw teeurad Xefaf7. ifcail ova^w»r 10 
"i ruaf«« * vni ien ^otx» o.' ^diMi ind o^ «iocaon io <aur^ » 
uud property U> be »<»id. in ifta /orm / e ^ f . ^ by U ~ , >»aicA 
<nail a< A i y flVad Tor nreord ty Tn»*«ac or JUwWxia^r 
21. (1) Allar 1*4 Ua*r o< *\*c» t i W u .nay in«» ^ 
requafad by ^ « ^oOo^arY tKe novrdaooft o< u i o aouct oi 
6ai>4jiiT >«» Kooce ai o*iaait and «O«TOC ai u x hrrm^ been 
pvrn *J Uk«M roqaifTsd by U « , T n u u * . -*r>f^ o«i 4«maj>d o^ 
Tractor. »aW) M 4 t*kl yppurry on cfcc daJa vad u cSa ia>* 
and placet o«b$nju«tl U ta>d AOCMZ of tain, siOxr as a vooW 
or in arpcarate paruis. ind \n »»<A order u if may 4ctrrmiac 
(bv< nioiecl to wry «Urt*ocy ri^pt oi Traator %o cHiTcr ike 
order in « n k o IUCA property, >T ccma2inf.o( jrreeii l a o w * 
loo yt parosb, atai) be aaaf), tl puj&A: tTKCon to -Aa 
SitJx« b^d^/ . a»» T^rdiaaa pnee sayabW W U * ^ mo.^y 
o< the UaJfui SUI4H u IJW rta\< of ui«. TV* pcraa^ 
co*du<B«l ta« uOa may. for any caaae ^a aain*a cjrpodiarK. 
portpone *<• mat <onaj tkme 10 arte aaol < ihai3 o< 
compasia«ft and, ta rwry aacd o n e , nooaa of paaeponarynont 
tKkH ba { i w i oy 7^o4k ondaraiion ihcrtx^ br nach asraott 
*t rtar uane aMpaaea- la« eppcaotad to* **>'-uk'. prwabad, if 
die ia ir » odfipOM^d tor lot^tf OUa> oor (1) 4ay oryasd i&e 
day rWai»wa^rt io t&e node* of una, ao^ca. daart-sf j t e d oar 
p**n * r V VMBM anniar AJ. An . orlfwaai aoHaa oi aiat. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
DEBORA G. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VERNAAR J. WILSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
0 
Civil No. 91440172 
Judge 
—ooOoo— 
The above-entitled matter came on for evidentiary hearing before the Court 
Commissioner on June 22, 1992. Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, David 
McPhie, and the defendant was present and represented by counsel, Gary Howe. 
A Stipulated Pre-Trial Order was entered into and filed with the court on February 
3, 1992, whereas the parties stipulated on the issued of child custody, visitation, and child 
support. The parties further stipulated that the disputed issues reserved for trial would be 
property division, debt payment, alimony, and attorney fee's. 
The court, having heard the evidence adduced by the parties through proffer and 
direct testimony in support of their respective positions, took the matter under advisement. 
The court having reviewed the above documentation and upon being advised in 
1 
earned and contributed to the marriage during those years. 
Defendant admitted that he realized advantages from his self-employment in the business 
known as The Iron Anvil or Double U Inc., that is co-owned by defendant and his father, and 
which allowed him to benefit from income that was not reported through the business, such as 
a family vacation that was written off as a business expense, vehicles, gas, and insurance 
coverage which were paid for by the business and used almost exclusively for family purposes, 
and cash payments from customers that went unreported for tax purposes. Thus, the court finds 
that substantial benefits were derived from defendant's business ownership and self-employment 
that enabled defendant to shelter some of his income from tax liability and that these benefits 
were used to directly subsidize the marriage. Therefore, the court finds that during the course 
of the marriage the parties derived additional income in the amount of approximately $10,000 
to $15,000 per year from The Iron Anvil or Double U Inc. Therefore, the court shall find that 
defendant's income for purposes of determining alimony and attorneys fee's is $45,000 per year. 
6. With regard to the valuation of the marital home, plaintiff alleges that the home 
which is located at 18185 West 1540 North, Fairfield, Utah, on an one acre parcel is worth 
approximately $60,000, and that the adjacent forty (40) acre parcel is valued at approximately 
$400 per acre for the "dry" land $1,000 per acre for the land which has access to irrigation 
water and is currently used as pasture. Plaintiff further testified that outbuildings on the 
property could be valued at $2,000. 
Defendant alleges that the home located on the one acre parcel is worth approximately 
$65,000 and that the marital home along with the additional acreage can be valued at 
approximately $90,000. 
3 
The court recognizes that the parties' real property is unique in nature in that marital 
home is a small family farm and acreage located in a rather remote small town. The court 
acknowledges that the parties attempted to have an appraisal done and that the appraisal was not 
completed before the trial date due to the difficulty the parties' appraiser encountered in making 
adequate comparisons to similar properties and in evaluating a fair market price for such an' 
unique piece of real property. 
Therefore, after taking into account both parties' testimony as to the recent sale prices 
and value of adjoining and nearby properties, the court finds that the real property comprised 
of the marital home on a one acre parcel and the additional forty (40) acres of adjacent, irrigated 
and un-irrigated pasture land should be valued at $80,000. According to testimony, the parties 
currently owe $44,353.23 on the property, thus their equity would be $35,646.77. ($80,000 
current market value - $44,353.23 balance owing = $35,646.77 equity.) Each party is awarded 
an one-half (1/2) share of the equity in the marital home in the amount of $17,823.38. Plaintiff 
is awarded the possession and use of the marital home and adjoining acreage and is ordered to 
pay defendant his one-half share of the equity. 
7. With regard to defendant's ownership share of stock in The Iron Anvil or Double 
U Inc., a business owned by defendant and his father, defendant alleges that he only owns 28% 
of the stock and plaintiff alleges that defendant has always represented to her that defendant's 
father and defendant own the business in a 60/40 split. The court will accept the figure of 
$33,004.00 as the value of stock owned by defendant in Double U Inc. See plaintiffs exhibit 
No. 12 Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to one-half (1/2) of defendant's share of Double U Inc. 
stock in the amount of $16,502. ($33,004 x 50% = $16,502.00). 
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The plaintiff may offset her share of the Double U Inc. stock in the amount of $16,502 
against defendant's share in equity of the marital home in the amount of $17,823.38. Therefore, 
plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant $1,321.38 for the balance of defendant's interest in the 
parties' equity in the home and defendant is ordered to release his interest in the home upon 
receipt of payment from plaintiff. 
8. With regard to the division of other personal property accumulated by the parties 
during the court of their marriage, the court orders defendant to return to plaintiff her wedding 
and engagement rings and the vise he took from the barn. Further, defendant is ordered to sign 
over to plaintiff the title to the horse trailer currently in her possession. 
All other remaining personal property, including household furnishings, farm equipment, 
and farm animals such as the horses, dogs, and goats shall be awarded to each of the parties as 
they have heretofore divided it, with the exception that defendant shall be allowed to retrieve 
the negatives of family photographs. 
9. With regard to the marital debts, defendant alleges that the parties borrowed 
$17,000 from the Iron Anvil or Double U Inc. in order to purchase a duplex from the buyers 
of the parties' Bluffdale home and the such purchase of the duplex was necessary to facilitate 
the sale of the Bluffdale home. Defendant alleges that plaintiff should be held jointly responsible 
for the $17,000 debt to The Iron Anvil or Double U Inc. 
Plaintiff alleges that no contingency agreement existed with the purchasers of the 
Bluffdale home and that the purchase of the duplex, which was subsequently foreclosed on, was 
solely an investment property purchased by The Iron Anvil or Double U Inc. for tax shelter 
purposes. 
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